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NEW WEST, NEW SOUTH, NEW REGION 
THE DISCOVERY OF THE SUNBELT 
It is not often that a new term enters the American language 
to describe our pattern of economic and cultural regions. We 
have happily used North, South, and West since the beginning of 
the nation. New England dates from the seventeenth century. 
George Washington talked about the Middle States. Even with 
relative newcomers, we find that the Pacific Northwest goes back 
a century and that the twelve states from Ohio to the Dakotas 
have been the Middle West since the years when Teddy Roosevelt 
1 
and William Howard Taft filled the White House. 
In recent years, people have been intrigued by new coinages 
like those used by Joel Garreau to describe the "nine nations of 
North America," but few Americans sprinkle references to "the 
empty quarter" or "the foundry" into everyday conversations. 
Schemes to consolidate and redraw state boundaries to match 
natural and economic divisions have a long lineage but limited 
impact. Neither Rexford Tugwell's proposal to designate twenty 
"United Republics'' nor Stanley Brunn' s Angelina and Tropicana 
have penetrated the national consciousness. Ecotopia, introduced 
by Ernest Callenbach's utopian novel in 1975, appears 
occasionally in the Pacific Northwest. In most cases, however, 
2 
the use is mildly ironic rather than serious. 
One great exception to the generalization is the seemingly 
instant success of Sunbelt. In the 1970s, "Sunbelt" became a 
sort of superstar of business and political journalism. It is, 
2 
perhaps, our newest "Middle West." The term appears to be deeply 
entrenched in popular use and essentially immune to criticism 
that the vernacular region does not coincide with important 
measurable patterns in economic activity or social and cultural 
behavior. 
Given the speed with which we have embraced the idea and 
terminiology of a Sunbelt, this essay attempts to explore several 
related issues. As an introduction, it will briefly review the 
process of introduction and acceptance of the term. It will then 
explore possible reasons for the "discovery" of the Sunbelt, its 
seemingly quick success, and its persistant use after it has 
slipped to the status of cliche in national journalism. The 
underlying concern is to understand why Americans took the new 
terminology so readily to heart by examining what it is that 
"Sunbelt" explains or implies that lies beyond the connotations 
of our more traditional regional terms. 
From Coinage to Cliche 
In standard accounts, credit for introduction of the term 
Sunbelt goes to Kevin Phillips and his 1969 analysis of The 
Emerging Republican Majority in national politics. Phillips used 
"Sun Belt" and "Sun Country" interchangeably to describe a region 
of conservative voting habits where Republicans could work to 
build their status as a new majority party. Phillips' sunbelters 
were the mobile, leisure-oriented middle class supplemented by 
3 
the new generation of relatively affluent and mobile retirees. 
The attribution is partially misleading. Like the 
3 
differential calculus and the theory of natural selection, the 
idea of a Sunbelt has had at least two independent formulations. 
Phillips was unaware of previous use and considered the term his 
own coinage, but Army Air Force planners as early as the 1940s 
had already defined and described a "sunshine belt" south of the 
37th parallel as the acceptable location for new air training 
4 
facilities. It seems fair to suggest that the "sunshine belt" 
remained buried in Pentagon documents not only for the technical 
reason that it was intended for internal military use but also 
because it was an idea whose time had not yet come. 
Secondly, Phillips used "Sunbelt" without clear definition 
of either its territory or characteristics. Given his basic 
concern with voting behavior, he was more interested in 
generalizations about the social consequences of Sunbelt growth 
than in its economic and demographic causes. Indeed, the book 
did not so much describe the region as cite four leading states. 
His prime examples were variously the "Florida-California Sun 
country," or the "new urban complexes of Texas and Florida," or 
5 
the four boom states of California, Arizona, Florida, and Texas. 
To a substantial degree, this analysis looked backward to 
previous studies of regional growth rather than forward to a new 
regional definition. It substantially restated classic work from 
the 1950s in which Edward Ullman and Harvey Perloff and his 
associates identified certain parts of Florida and the Southwest 
as benefitting from environmental amenities, 
6 
and expanding local markets. 
resource endowment, 
Indeed, the time was no more ripe for "Sunbelt" in 1969 than 
4 
for "sunshine belt" twenty-five years earlier. Perhaps because 
of the lack of innovation in its application, Phillips' new term 
languished for another six years. Political analyst Samuel 
Lubell tried it the next year but preferred to organize his 
7 
discussion of voting trends around traditional regions. Austin 
apparently pioneered the use of "Sunbelt" in promotional 
advertising in 1973, but national magazine articles on boom times 
in the old Confederacy continued to talk about the "South," "new 
South," and "new rich South" through the first half of the 
8 
1970s. As has been widely noted, it was Kirkpatrick Sale's 
Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and its Challenge to 
the Norther~ Establishment and a series of New York Times 
articles on February 9-13, 1976, that first popularized the 
idea of a Sunbelt (even though Sale used different terminology) 
9 
and provided the rudiments of an operational definition. 
The term passed from coinage to cliche in 1976 and 1977. 
The Times seal of significance made it an instant hit in the 
press. One sunbelt scholar has called the bicentennial year "the, 
Golden Age of Sunbelt promotion," with articles in nearly every 
trend-setting periodical on the Sunbelt's growing political and 
10 
economic power and emerging image. Appearing at a time when 
many northeastern and middle western states and cities were 
finding it difficult to recover from economic recession, the idea 
that federal policy had long favored the growth of what was now 
identified as the Sunbelt became the pivot for a major policy 
11 
debate in 1976-78. Although popular attention to the Sunbelt 
began to fade in the late 1970s, scholarship in the 1980s 
reflects the customary five-year lag between identification of a 
5 
phenonenon and completion of substantial social science research. 
A set of social science and humanities data bases shows nine 
citations to "Sunbeltn in 1976, an average of 32 per year for 
1977-79, and an average of 53 per year for 1980-82. As a sure 
sign of academic respectability, "sunbelt" has become a catchword 
that is used in scholarly titles where the less glamorous but 
12 
sometimes more accurate West or South would do just as well. 
Sunbelt as a Regional Concept 
The volume of attention has supported what can be called a 
"smoke and fire" approach which assumes that the Sunbelt must 
exist if so many people are talking about it, writing about it, 
and using the term in promotional literature. The working 
definition is fuzzy at best, bundling together a wide set of 
characteristics that seem to be spatially associated. One 
identifiable set of traits relate to the Sunbelt as a regional 
development phenonenon resulting from a secular shift in the 
comparative advantage of regions. Specific explanations for the 
recent rapid growth of the Sunbelt variously emphasize locational 
decisions in response to amenities; locational decisions in 
response to regional market growth; migration and 
industrialization based on traditional agricultural and mineral 
resources; and migration in response to basic changes in the 
13 
industrial mix of the American economy. A second set of 
characteristics relate to the Sunbelt as a distinct socio-
cultural environment involving both lifestyle choices that are 
6 
most easily expressed in low-density, automobile-oriented 
communities with easy access to outdoor recreation and distinct 
14 
political values that support rapid growth. 
Taking a step back to reexamine the Sunbelt as a concept, 
however, we find several peculiarities that throw doubt on its 
regional identity. Most obviously, it is difficult to use the 
presumptive defining characteristics to generate objective 
measures whose distribution coincides with the territory south of 
the 37th parallel--the consensual Sunbelt boundary as defined by 
15 
journalistic convention and popular usage. Key factors 
reflecting the emergence of a Sunbelt might be rates of 
metropolitan growth, location of national and regional 
metropolitan centers with high levels of producer services, and 
distribution of the interrelated high technology manufacturing, 
research and development, and military-defense spending. None of 
these key regional development factors has been confined to the 
Sunbelt nor distributed evenly within the consensual Sunbelt. I 
have argued elsewhere that these same factors allow division of 
the "census South" into a rapidly developing "Outer South" of the 
Chesapeake Bay states, Florida, and Texas-Oklahoma, a 
transitional "Middle South" of Louisiana, Georgia, and the 
Carolinas, and a more slowly growing "Inner South" dominated by 
old industries. An extension of the same analysis suggests that 
Texas-Oklahoma can simultaneously be viewed as part of a western-
southwestern growth zone that includes Colorado, Utah, Nevada, 
16 
New Mexico, Arizona, and all of the Pacific states (Map 1). An 
earlier study by Browning and Gesler using 1970-76 data on 
federal spending, population growth, and economic well-being 
7 
concluded that neither Maryland-Virginia nor Florida belonged 
with the South and that the West had "more characteristics 
17 
associated with the Sunbelt than the Sunbelt itself." 
Cultural factors also show discontinuity rather than 
uniformity across the Sunbelt states. As one obvious example, 
ethnic mix and the resulting social and political tensions vary 
markedly from the eastern to western ends of the Sunbelt, with a 
divide west of Waco and Fort Worth. The South and Southwest have 
shown different patterns of ethnic assimilation and majority-
minority relations. Religious affliation links the entirety of 
the historic South and sets it apart from the West and Southwest. 
Tastes in magazine reading, however, place Texas and Oklahoma 
with California and Oregon while separating Florida and Virginia 
18 
from. the rest of the southeast. As a transitional subregion, 
Texas effectively functions with the dual identity of a southern 
19 
and a western state. 
It is equally difficult to find a uniform set of political 
values across the Sunbelt. States tilt from liberal to 
conservative, or mix the two in odd local brews, on the basis of 
internal dynamics of personality, party organization, and 
parochial issues. Sunbelt voters have been inconsistent in 
enlisting in Phillips' emerging Republican majority. Charlotte, 
Nashville, Atlanta, Memphis, Little Rock, Corpus Christi, and 
Austin gave fewer than half their votes to Ronald Reagan in 1980. 
Miami, Tampa, Tucson, and Baton Rouge gave fewer than 51 percent. 
The typical Sunbelt politician of the last decade may have been 
Jesse Helms, Jeremiah Denton, John Tower, or Barry Goldwater. It 
8 
may also have been Tom Hayden, Jerry Brown, Bruce Babbitt, Henry 
Cisneros, or Andrew Young. 
In addition to lacking consistent defining characteristics, 
the consensual Sunbelt is less firmly fixed than might first 
appear. Many southeasterners use "Sunbelt" as another name for 
the South Atlantic and Gulf states with a spillover into the 
desert. To many southwesterners, however, the real Sunbelt runs 
from California to Texas, with Florida as an outlier. We find 
similar results in comparing the Sunbelt images of political 
journalists and of college students in Chapel Hill, Grand 
20 
Junction, Phoenix, and Davis, California. Regional leaders 
also define partial Sunbelts. David Mathews, a former southern 
university president and Ford cabinet member, uses Sunbelt as a 
synonym for South, but Colorado governor Richard Lamm defines the 
21 
Sunbelt as "the West and Southwest." 
All of these problems of ambiguous definition bring us back 
to the basic issue of why Americans have found the idea or 
terminology of a Sunbelt so appealing, even when we can't quite 
figure out what it is. Indeed, we have devised and accepted a 
term that reverses our customary pattern of regional coinage. In 
the past, Americans have either renamed the same region ("West" 
becomes successively "Northwest," "Old Northwest," and "Middle 
West") or responded to increasing density of settlement and 
variety of development by subdividing a large region into 
subareas ("West" becomes "West Coast," "Pacific Northwest," 
"Southwest," "Mountain States," and the like). In the later 
1970s, however, we recombined portions of regions that had 
historically maintained very distinct identities. Given the 
9 
limited match with measurable factors and the continuing economic 
and cultural differences between South and West/Southwest, it is 
appropriate to ask (1) what purpose or need has been served by 
the identification and publicizing of a Sunbelt and (2) what 
factors account for the time-specific acceptance of the new 
terminology in the later 1970s? 
West, South, and Sunbelt: 
Growth and Change in Regional Images 
One approach to these questions is to examine the historic 
regional images of the South and West, the components from which 
the idea of a Sunbelt has been assembled, utilizing the broad 
categories of economic growth and socio-cultural distinctiveness 
that are the chief pillars of the Sunbelt definition. In brief 
summary, such a review suggests that the definition of a 
"Sunbelt" has incorporated many characteristics long associated 
with the reputation of the American West but has required a 
substantial revaluation of the South. Whereas the West has been 
able to evolve smoothly into the Sunbelt, the "Sunbelting" of the 
South has required a fundamental transformation of regional 
reputation and self-image. 
The American West provides the easy case, for its historic 
image as a society reborn and remolded has in many ways previewed 
the bundle of traits associated with the Sunbelt. The "New West" 
beyond the 95th meridian has simultaneously epitomized American 
society and represented its future. A parade of writers in the 
middle nineteenth century depicted the West as the logical 
10 
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extension and climax of American growth. Growth of the West, 
claimed a Chicago editor in 1856, was "laying the foundation for 
an empire of whose wealth, intelligence and power the sun in all 
his course has never seen the equal.u The eccentric politician 
and promoter William Gilpin thought the Rockies to be "the key-
point of centrality and unrivaled excellence" whose 
settlement would "stir the sleep of a hundred centuries ... teach 
old nations a new civilization . . shed a new and resplendent 
glory upon mankind." The West was a land of new beginnings open 
to individual initiative and social opportunity. The "Imperial 
Period of National Greatness," said John Wilstach, would rise in 
the Mississippi, Colorado, and Columbia basins, where there was 
"nothing to prevent the freest scope of the inventive and moral 
22 
energies of man.I! 
A new generation of observers repeated the same themes at 
the end of the century. Charles Dudley Warner in 1888 reported 
the "joyousness of conquest and achievementu and the "marvellous 
building up of new societies" on the northern plains of the Great 
West. William Thayer's Marvels of the New West included 
"populous and wealthy cities that have grown into power and 
beauty as if by magic. 11 In another hundred years, he predicted, 
western cities would surpass those of the East in enterprise and 
economic power, with the result "a national growth and 
consummation without a parallel in human history." The 
scholarly and always quotable James Bryce after a series of 
visits in the 1880s found the West "the most American part of 
America," a land of "passionate eagerness" where "men seem to 
11 
live in the future rather than the present. 11 Even Josiah Strong, 
who feared the impacts of immigration, urbanization, Mormonism, 
Romanism, socialism, and whiskey on America's moral stability, 
was convinced by 1890 that the West held the key to the nation's 
future. With twice the population, wealth, and political weight 
of the East, its "preponderating influence" would soon determine 
23 
"national character, and therefore, destiny.u (Strong, 1890). 
The new residents of the mountain and Pacific West shared 
the dominant view. Kevin Starr has documented in detail the 
"California Dream" of creating a new society in a new land. 
Hubert Howe Bancroft found on the Pacific coast "the ringing up 
of universal intelligence for a final display of what man can do 
at his best . surrounded by conditions such as had never 
before befallen the lot of man to enjoy." Historian Gunther 
Barth has examined the dimensions of urban patriotism in Denver 





overweening confidence in the towns, and faith that 
growth made a direct contribution to the 
24 
national 
strongest countertheme to western optimism and 
confidence appeared during the 1920s and 1930s, when deep 
depressions in mining and agriculture reminded many westerners of 
their dependence on eastern capital and corporations. In 
particular, the Rockies and Great Plains produced a series of 
writers who described and deplored the "colonial" dependency of 
25 
their states. However, the literature was as much for the 
promotion of an internal political agenda as for external 
26 
consumption. The concern largely bypassed the relatively 
12 
prosperous oil regions of Texas, Oklahoma, and southern 
California, where agricultural crisis coexisted with metropolitan 
boom. 
The flush times after 1940 brought restatement and 
reaffirmation of the West's special status. Wallace Stegner and 
Earl Pomeroy, among others, argued that the West was the most 
typically American part of the nation. The Pacific coast in 
particular was like the rest of the United States, only more so, 
expressing the national culture at its most energetic. It was 
urban, opulent, energetic, mobile, and individualistic, a region 
of economic growth and openness to change--a list of 
characteritsics that matched America's favorite self-image and 
27 
previewed the common description of the Sunbelt. From the idea 
that the West was America at the extreme, it took only a short 
step to the belief that the West embodied the national future. 
The region in the postwar era, said historian Gerald Nash 
anticipated economic and social trends by a generation. Neil 
Morgan asserted that "the West of today is very likely a close 
kin of the America of tomorrow." California, in turn, was the 
future of the West--Carey McWilliams' "Great Exception" and Neil 
28 
Morgan's "center of gravity in the westward tilt." 
The western image has also embraced several more specific 
subthemes that were established between 1870 and 1920 and 
reaffirmed after 1945. Like the broader enthusiasm about the 
regional future, they anticipate in detail some of the traits 
associated with the contemporary Sunbelt. The dry and benign 
environment of the Rockies and Southwest, for example, attracted 
13 
tens of thousands of nineteenth-century health seekers and 
29 
created a sanatorium belt that curved from Denver to Pasadena. 
The same areas formed the heart of a post-World War II retirement 
zone that has spread from an historic base in Southern 
California. They have also offered prime examples of high-
amenity areas that have grown because of their attraction for 
footloose industries such as electronics, where the original 
Silicon Valley has been followed by a silicon prairie in Texas, a 
silicon desert in Arizona, a silicon mountain in Colorado, and a 
30 
silicon forest in Oregon. 
The West has also been a land of new starts. California, 
Colorado, and Puget Sound were all centers for utopian 
communities in the several decades after the Civil War. 
Twentieth-century manifestations of the same impulse have ranged 
from Southern California's image as a haven for crackpots in the 
1920s and 1930s to the diffusion of 1965-75 communes through 
31 
California, New Mexico-Colorado, and the Pacific Northwest. 
Western states pioneered in the expansion of legal rights for 
32 
women such as presidential suffrage and liberal divorce laws. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the Mountain and Pacific states 
have ranked consistently high on indicators of social opportunity 
such as political participation and levels of health, welfare 
33 
support, and education. Their metropolitan areas have scored 
relatively high on indicators of social well-being from the 1930s 
34 
to the 1970s. 
The South has had no such luck. For more than a century 
after the Civil War, the core of the southern image was 
backwardness. It was poor, it was rural, and it lacked major 
14 
industrial development. A laggard economy implied a society 
that was only half modern, with strong agrarian values, high 
levels of violence, and limited attention to or investment in 
education. The racial caste system not only burdened the 
regional economy but also denied the concepts of individual 
opportunity and careers open to talent that formed the foundation 
of North Atlantic liberalism. From one perspective the South 
might be quaintly or reassuringly traditional. From another, its 
twin burdens of race and poverty made it the nation's great 
social problem. In either case, its defining characteristic was 
its failure to participate fully in the growth of the modern 
nation. 
The counterimage of a "New Southu was essentially rooted in 
the same negative comparison. As a prescription for regional 
change, advocates of a New South in the 1880s and its various 
reincarnations in the twentieth century offered an agenda for 
35 
industrialization in imitation of the North. The idea of a 
laggard South converging on national norms dominated southern 
social science through much of the present century. Although the 
degree to which southern manufacturing actually disturbed the 
political and social status quo was limited, its development was 
commonly presumed to be a transforming cause that would bring 
large cities, a cosmopolitan middle class, modernization of 
values, and a more open and tolerant society. Dozens of 
sociologists and economists stated the theory of convergence, 
analyzed its implications, and mined each decennial census for 
data on urbanization, occupational structure, health, income, and 
15 
education that would confirm or postpone 
36 
incorporation" of the region. 
the "national 
The popular image of the South as shaped by news and 
entertainment media was equally negative. Jack Temple Kirby has 
traced the evolution from sharecropper and gothic novels and 
documentary photography in the 1920s and 1930s to the "tribal, 
passionate, and neurotic" South of the 1940s and 1950s. Civil 
rights agitation and reactive violence in the 1960s brought 
"neoabolitionist" dramas that confronted the evils of the 
37 
udevilish South." 
At start of 1970s, the South and West were still sharply 
contrasted in public image and public opinion. The same year 
that brought The Emerging Republican Majority to the bookstores 
also brought Easy Rider to the nation's movie theaters. Its pair 
of drugged-soaked buddies, as Americans over 30 will remember, 
took a motorcycle tour across the southern tier of the United 
States. They did not ride through a "Sunbelt." Instead, the 
movie contrasted a positive image of the West--an idyllic commune 
in the mountains of New Mexico--with increasingly negative and 
violent images of the South that include an acid trip in a New 
Orleans cemetary and a final confrontation with the deadly 
violence of the deep South. The contrasting southenr chic of the 
mid-1970s, which ranged from "The Waltons" to the national 
popularity of country music, still functioned within the 
farmework of negative comparison. The South supplied pastoral 
simplicity in contrast to the complexity of the North. In a very 
different sector of the communications industry, Wall Street 
Journal articles on the South remained heavily negative through 
16 
38 
the first half of the 1970s. A national survey during the same 
years found that southerners were relatively happy with their own 
region, but that only Florida was significantly attractive to 
outsiders. The population of the mountain states, by comparison, 
would have increased by 124 percent and the Pacific states by 41 
percent if everyone desiring to live elsewhere moved to their 
39 
region of preference. 
In the middle and late 1970s, in contrast, the public 
reputation of the South changed drastically with the discovery of 
the Sunbelt. For the first time since the Civil War, the idea of 
a Sunbelt allowed the newest New South to deny its dependence and 
subordination to the North. Regional progress could suddenly be 
defined in terms of convergence or kinship with the dynamic West 
as part of a new leading sector marked by fast growth and fast 
living. In a sense, the idea of a Sunbelt allowed the South to 
escape its own history and transform instantly from "backward" 
to "forward" region. 
The jump out of history was possible for two somewhat 
contradictory reasons. One reason, of course, was the 
culmination of the social revolution anticipated and applauded by 
40 
the convergence theory. Whatever its stand on issues of 
lifestyle, the South crossed the threshold of liberal society in 
terms of individual opportunity in the early 1970s. The 
relatively peaceful climax of the civil rights revolution and 
peaceful school integration of the 1970s gave the South an 
unexpected reputation for racial moderation, as did the arrival 
of a more progressive political generation represented in the 
17 
national media by the gubernatorial ABCs of Askew, Bumpers, and 
Carter. The reversal of black outmigration during the 1970s 
gained wide recognition as a reflection of both the realignment 
of the southern political system and the economic problems of old 
41 
industrial core. 
The second reason, ironically, was the previously mentioned 
divergence of economic fortunes within the South. Texas, 
Florida, and secondarily the South Atlantic states were changing 
so rapidly by the middle 1970s that the economic imagery of 
"South" and "New South" no longer seemed adequate. The result 
was the adoption of the Sunbelt and its associated imagery as 
appropriate for the booming periphery of the South, with the rest 
of the region drawn along by the force of the new terminology. 
Conclusions 
The discovery of the Sunbelt has created an enlarged vision 
for the South that is essentially an enlarged version of the 
West. The idea of a Sunbelt has meant more for the for the 
former region than for the latter. The West/Southwest hasn't 
really needed the Sunbelt, since it has already had a positive 
regional reputation. California surfers and Texas 
"superAmericans" merge easily and directly into the idea of a 
Sunbelt. The South, however, is fundamentally redefined when it 
is viewed in terms of the Sunbelt. Having been historically 
defined in negative terms, the South has found a sort of rescue 
from its past on the coattails of the Sunbelt. 
Both this specific conclusion and the preceding analysis 
18 
strongly suggest the value of disaggregating the consensual 
Sunbelt among subregions and states. Very preliminary evidence 
indicates that the Sunbelt may have found its first and perhaps 
strongest home in Texas and Oklahoma, a pattern that may reflect 
both the ambiguity of their regional identity (cultural South and 
economic West) and their potential role in bridging perceived 
42 
and real differences between Southeast and Southwest. It would 
be useful to examine in more depth and detail whether Sunbelt 
imagery has been adopted more readily or extensively in some 
states and cities than in others and whether there are 
subregional differences in the context or content of such use 
that reflect the different experiences and needs of West, Outer 
South, and Inner South. 
A related issue is the extent to which patterns of 
metropolitan growth, which lies at the heart of the processes 
associated with the development of a Sunbelt, confirm or deny its 
regional identity. My own suggestion is that patterns of 
economic and demographic change can no longer be understood in 
terms of the traditional South however named, since the strongest 
growth areas are increasingly oriented away from the southern 
43 
heartland. In contrast, the same sorts of growth factors may 
well be operating to maintain unity between the northern and 
southern West. Several strings of cities that stretch north and 
south across regional and even international boundaries share 
certain growth histories, 
44 
economic funcions, and probable 
futures. Indeed, much of the contemporary regional patterning 
of the West (and Sunbelt) can be understood in terms of the 
19 
expansion and intensification of influence of Greater Texas 
(reaching from the Louisiana oil country and Ozark retirement 
zone into the oil regions of Colorado and Wyoming) and Greater 
California (including Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Hawaii). Texas 
and California influence have deep historic roots and can be 
measured in patterns of finance and investment, permanent and 
45 
seasonal migration, distribution, and recreational travel. 
Florida, which maintains stronger ties with the Caribbean and the 
Snowbelt than with the interior South, appears to lack the same 
sort of regional "empire" but to fill a growing role in 
46 
international commerce. Atlanta is an important regional 
center but lacks the national standing of Los Angeles or Houston. 
Interestingly, it appears to have become relatively more oriented 
to the South Atlantic than to the inner South over the last 
47 
generation. 
Given the contention that the discovery of a Sunbelt has 
been of special significance for the South, a final question is 
the extent to which the Sunbelt idea may be seen as a denial 
rather than a vindication of the South. A number of specialists 
on southern history and society have recently called attention to 
the cultural distinctiveness that persists in spite of economic 
and demographic change. The broad reevaluation of what John S. 
Reed calls Th~ Enduring South has led historians, geographers, 
and sociologists to explore the continuing identity of the South 
as a cultural region. Southern cities, says historian David 
Goldfield, have remained peculiarly southern in many aspects of 
their everyday life even while participating the great postwar 
boom. The prototypical Phillips-Sale Sunbelter is a deracinated 
20 
and isolated individual adrift in the suburbs or Dallas or 
retirement communities of Florida. The Goldfield-Reed 
southerner, rooted in networks of kinship and religion and 
committed to traditional patterns of social behavior, in 
contrast, may enjoy some of the fruits of "sunbelt" prosperity 
but retains more in common with the nineteenth century South than 
48 
with contemporary La Jolla or Las Vegas. 
The basic uncertainty about the idea of a Sunbelt is the 
mismatch between regional need and regional performance. The 
emergence of the idea of a Sunbelt is tied directly to the 
modernization of the South, but California, Arizona, Texas, and 
the Florida peninsula have been its centers of development and 
change. The traditional core South makes the smallest 
contribution to the consensual Sunbelt in terms of population 
growth, metropolitan development, leading economic sectors, or 
cultural innovation, yet the idea of a Sunbelt is of greatest 
potential benefit for states such as Mississippi, Tennessee, and 
Arkansas. We are left with the need for detailed research on the 
regional and subregional incidence of sunbelt imagery that is 
accompanied by objective analysis of social and economic 
patterns. Taken alone, either approach gives us a partial view 
of the Sunbelt. Taken together, they can help us understand the 
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